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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the interaction of motivations among contributors to online 
crowdfunding campaigns.  Based on evidence from the literature on philanthropic behaviour, 
we argue that funder behaviour is likely to be driven by a combination of intrinsic, extrinsic 
and image enhancement motivations. We undertake an empirical investigation into the 
relationships between these factors by analysing data from an online rewards-based 
crowdfunding platform.  These data not only reveal the monetary values of individual 
contributions to fundraising campaigns, but also indicate particular combinations of 
motivations based on the material reward selected (if any) and the decision as to whether or 
not to contribute anonymously.  We find that extrinsically motivated funders generally make 
larger contributions than intrinsically motivated funders, which does not suggest the presence 
of a ‘crowding-out’ effect given the presence of material incentives.  We further show that 
named funders with intrinsic motivations contribute more than anonymous funders with 
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extrinsically motivated funders.  The evidence from our study therefore suggests that image 
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1. Introduction 
 
The economics literature on philanthropy broadly suggests that contributors to 
collective fundraising activities are driven by combinations of three main factors: intrinsic, 
extrinsic and image enhancement motivations (Ariely et al., 2009).  Intrinsic motivations, 
such as altruism, warm-glow or other forms of prosocial preferences (Andreoni, 1989; 
Harbaugh, 1998) reflect the purely internal satisfaction derived from the act of giving.  
Extrinsic motivations refer to the desire to acquire material rewards or other benefits, such as 
a CD, t-shirt or event tickets, while image enhancement refers to concerns relating the 
perceptions of others and a desire to be liked and respected.   
While each of these factors might serve to motivate pro-social behaviour in its own 
right, the relationship may also be significantly affected by their interaction. Indeed, a 
seminal study by Titmuss (1970) reports seemingly counter-intuitive evidence that the offer 
of monetary incentives for blood donations leads to a reduction in the number of donors.  
Benabou & Tirole (2006) refer to this phenomenon as the ‘first puzzle’ in research on 
prosocial activity whereby “providing rewards and punishment to foster prosocial behaviour 
sometimes has a perverse effect, reducing the total contribution provided by agents.” 
(p.1652).  More recent empirical evidence seems to suggest that while the offer of monetary 
incentives might disincentivise prosocial behaviour levels (Lacetera & Macis, 2010a; 
Mellström & Johannesson, 2008), other forms of material rewards may still act as an 
effective motivation (Goetter & Stutzer, 2008; Lacetera et al., 2009).  
We extend this line of research by conducting an investigation into the behaviour of 
funders of rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns.  We base our analysis on data from the 
website fundanything.com, which we show to be broadly representative of other online 
platforms in many respects.  In the rewards-based crowdfunding model, funders are 
incentivised through the offer of a range of material (non-financial) rewards proportionate to 
the value of their contributions, including simple ‘thank-you’ notes, baseball caps, DVDs etc.  
However, given mixed evidence from the literature reported above, it is unclear if the 
offering of material incentives would be effective in increasing contributions from funders in 
this particular setting.  Our first research question is therefore: ‘To what extent is the 
behaviour of contributors to online crowdfunding campaigns affected by the opportunity to 
claim rewards’?   
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Additionally, while enquiries into the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations have been long established, several other studies (Harbaugh, 1998; Andreoni & 
Petrie, 2004) have sought to investigate various interactions between these factors and the 
desire for image enhancement. In the context of rewards-based crowdfunding, contributing 
money to a campaign and not claiming an available reward may be interpreted as a generous 
or altruistic action which improves the social image of funders.  By contrast, the claiming of a 
reward might be considered greedy or selfish, leading to a ‘signal-extraction’ problem 
(Benabou & Tirole, 2006) whereby the signalling value of the contribution becomes diluted 
(Ariely et al., 2009).  Image concerns may therefore interact differently with intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations, which leads to our second research question: ‘To what extent is the 
behaviour of contributors to online crowdfunding campaigns affected by interactions of 
image enhancement and intrinsic/extrinsic motivations’? 
Our research provides several important contributions to the literature. First, our 
unique data and approach to identifying implied motivations enables us to divide the funders 
in our dataset into two distinct groups depending upon whether a reward is claimed in return 
for their contribution.  On this basis, we categorise funders as either being solely intrinsically 
motivated or at least partly extrinsically motivated.  This distinction allows us to investigate 
interactions between intrinsic/extrinsic motivations and the desire for image enhancement.  A 
majority of studies in this area, such as Carpenter & Myers, 2010 and Lacetera & Macis, 
2010b, are only able to investigate the interactions between image enhancement and either 
intrinsic or extrinsic motivations, making it very difficult to form direct comparisons.  
Second, our work substantially extends the emerging literature on the supply-side of 
crowdfunding, which stands in contrast with the majority of published studies that focus 
almost exclusively on the demand side (e.g. Mollick, 2014; Vismara, 2016).  Only a small 
number of studies appearing to-date (Ryu & Kim, 2016; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Jian & 
Shin, 2015) have empirically investigated motivations in crowdfunding by focusing on data 
at the individual funder-level, typically through the use of relatively small-scale surveys 
capturing subjective assessments of motivations.   To the best of our knowledge, ours is the 
first study to objectively identify and distinguish between the underlying motivations of 
contributors to crowdfunding campaigns based on a large sample of observed rather than 
stated behaviours. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 outlines the theoretical 
framework which underpins our analysis, where after we accordingly establish a set of 
specific research hypotheses in Section 3.  An overview of our data and methods is provided 
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in Section 4, while Section 5 presents the results and analysis from our empirical estimations.  
Section 6 concludes by offering a broad overview and summary of our findings, as well as 
implications for our understanding of motivations to participate in collective fundraising 
activities. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Our research is built upon the economic theory of philanthropic behaviour, given that 
funders of online fundraising campaigns and reward-based crowdfunding have been argued 
to be similar in many respects to their offline equivalents (Bøg et al., 2012; Gerber et al., 
2012).  On the surface, charitable activity and volunteerism appear to be at odds with the 
assumptions of neoclassical economic theory, which suggests that individuals tend to behave 
in a way that is consistent with rational self-interest.  Indeed, several economists have argued 
that the ‘pure altruism’ model offers an inadequate explanation for giving behaviour, as any 
increase in individual contributions would end up being offset by decreases in the 
contributions of others in order to maintain the socially optimal level of giving (Sugden, 
1982; Andreoni, 1988).   Instead, many economists tend to conceptualise donors as ‘impure 
altruists’ who are driven by a range of private as well as social motives. These private 
motives might include intrinsic motivations such as a ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni, 1990) or a 
sense of satisfaction (Beretti, 2011). Donors might also be motivated extrinsically through the 
offer of various material and tangible rewards, as well as by a desire for image and 
reputational enhancement (Ariely et al., 2009).  Given these various private motivations for 
giving based around personal gain, Vestelund (2006) suggests that “at the most extreme level, 
the private benefit of donating is no different from that of purchasing any other private good. 
(p.573)” 
Although each of these motivations might incentivise prosocial behaviour in their 
own right, it is also the case that they might interact with one another.  For example, Frey 
(1994) argues that offering extrinsic rewards to intrinsically motivated contributors reduces 
the value of their altruistic feelings thus may discourage them from contributing.  Beretti et 
al. (2013) further argue that “external incentives can change the perceptions people have 
about a given task, notably by turning goodwill into a market-like interaction leading to a 
decrease of the overall contribution” (p.3).  A number of other studies go a stage further by 
incorporating the interactions of image motivations with intrinsic or extrinsic motivations 
within formal theoretical frameworks.  For example, the model developed by Harbaugh 
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(1998) assumes that donors are motivated by intrinsic and prestige benefits, suggesting that 
publically revealing the values of individual donations ultimately enhances the associated 
prestige benefits and serves as a motivation to make larger contributions. In the theoretical 
model proposed by Benabou & Tirole (2006), the value that each individual agent attaches to 
their image depends on the visibility of their actions, with the presence of visible rewards 
casting doubt among others over the true motivations for prosocial behaviour.  Following this 
proposition, Ariely et al. (2009) consider image enhancement to be influenced by the 
perception of others regarding the merits of specific activities in which the individual is 
engaged.  Behaving pro-socially largely enhances one’s image, although offering extrinsic 
rewards may ultimately backfire as a donors are “suspected to be acting prosocially for 
extrinsic rewards rather than out of intrinsic motivations” (Ariely et al., 2009, p.546). Taken 
together, economic theory predicts that the presence of incentives appealing to the extrinsic 
motivations of contributors may have the unintended consequence of ‘crowding out’ 
motivations associated with image enhancement. 
 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
 
3.1 Rewards and prosocial behaviour 
Several studies find empirical evidence in support of the original arguments put 
forward in the seminal work of Titmus (1970).  For example, Frey & Goette (1999) show that 
offering rewards actually leads to a reduction in effort among volunteers, while Mellström & 
Johannesson (2008) report a significant crowding-out effect of monetary incentives amongst 
female blood donors. Recent studies, however, suggest that the nature of the reward can 
influence whether it is perceived as a net incentive or disincentive.  Lacetera & Macis 
(2010a) report that a substantial proportion of blood donors indicate that they would stop 
donating if offered €10 in cash, with the effect diminishing significantly if a voucher of the 
same nominal value is offered. The authors suggest that donors do not appear to demonstrate 
a general aversion to material incentives per se, but do show a clear aversion to the offer of 
cash. The incentivising effect of material incentives such as lottery tickets and symbolic 
rewards on blood donation is also documented in Costa-Font et al. (2013), Goetter & Stutzer 
(2008) and Lacetera et al. (2009). This line of evidence is in many respects consistent with 
the view of donations as a form of individual consumption (Fink, 2017).   
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Given that the offer of material incentives in exchange for financial contributions 
represents the core basis of rewards-based crowdfunding (see Section 4.1 for further details), 
it is likely that the presence of tangible rewards will not lead to a crowding-out of funders 
with intrinsic motivations in this particular context.  Furthermore, the offer of material 
rewards may lead to a relative price effect (Ariely et al., 2009), such that extrinsically 
motivated funders will make larger monetary contributions in order to benefit from the 
provision of higher-value rewards.  Thus, we hypothesise that: 
 
H1: Funders driven in whole or in part by extrinsic motivations will contribute greater 
monetary amounts to any given campaign compared with purely intrinsically motivated 
funders.    
 
3.2 Image motivations, reward and prosocial behaviour 
We extend our analysis to investigate the impact of a desire for image enhancement 
on the behaviours of funders with extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. First, consistent with 
the theoretical arguments presented in the previous section, evidence from the empirical 
literature shows that people tend to increase levels of prosocial activity in public rather than 
private settings due to concerns over their image.  For example, Harbaugh (1998) shows 
evidence of significant changes in donation behaviour when organisations report the value of 
contributions in tiered ‘bandings’. More specifically, the author reports significant increases 
in the proportion of donations made at the minimum amount necessary to reach a particular 
tier.  Lacetera & Macis (2010b) further demonstrate that pro-social activity (blood-donation) 
increases dramatically when agents are close to meeting the threshold for the award of a 
medal, although this finding only holds when medals are awarded publically.  In our study, 
we argue that contributing to a crowdfunding project without claiming a reward signals 
altruistic motivations to others and may thus result in image enhancement. Intrinsically 
motivated contributors therefore have an opportunity to enhance their image and reputation as 
a result of their giving so long as they make their identity known to others. We therefore 
hypothesise that: 
 
H2a: Among solely intrinsically motivated funders, those with a desire for image 
enhancement will contribute greater monetary amounts to any given campaign compared 
with funders with no desire for image enhancement. 
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Second, a number of previous studies demonstrate empirically that extrinsic 
incentives may have a detrimental effect on prosocial behaviour because they interact 
negatively with image motivations.  For example, Ariely et al. (2009) show that the presence 
of monetary incentives only leads to an increase in prosocial activity in private and not public 
settings, as extrinsic motivations ‘crowds out’ the desire for image enhancement. Carpenter & 
Myers (2010) find that paying small stipends to volunteer firefighters with image concerns 
(identified as those with personalised licence plates) actually reduces their propensity to turn 
out for emergency calls. In our specific research context, contributing to a crowdfunding 
project and claiming a reward may result in a signal-extraction problem as outlined above, 
whereby others may question whether or not the contribution was motivated a desire to obtain 
material rewards. Contributing greater sums to a crowdfunding campaign may therefore be 
less likely to result in image enhancement among funders who elect to claim a reward1. We 
therefore hypothesise that: 
 
H2b: Among partly extrinsically motivated funders, those with a desire for image 
enhancement will not contribute greater monetary amounts to any given campaign compared 
with funders with no desire for image enhancement. 
 
 
4. Data and Research Design  
 
4.1. Data 
Crowdfunding is a process whereby the founder of a campaign raises funds from a 
crowd of contributors (funders), usually through the Internet. Rewards-based crowdfunding, 
typified by platforms such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo, is presently among the most well-
known of the four types of crowdfunding which also include donation, equity and loan-based 
models.  Funders of rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns are given the opportunity to 
claim material (non-financial) incentives, including baseball caps, t-shirts, tickets, limited 
edition products etc., so long their individual monetary contributions exceed certain stated 
thresholds (Gerber et al., 2012; Tomczack & Brem, 2013).  However, funders may decline 
the opportunity to receive a reward to which they would otherwise be entitled.  The founder 
of a campaign is typically only allowed to retain the monetary amount raised so long as the 
                                                          
1 We acknowledge that funders could still enhance their image by contributing higher monetary amounts than actually needed for the 
reward they eventually claim.  In practice, there are very few instances in our dataset (just over 2% of observations) where funders give 
more than the threshold amount required for a particular reward. 
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aggregate total raised meets or exceeds a funding target established at the start of the 
campaign. 
The dataset used in this study is gathered from rewards-based crowdfunding platform 
founded in 2013 known as fundanything.com.  As with other rewards-based platforms, 
visitors to the website can elect contribute towards individual campaigns hosted by the 
platform with the prospect of claiming a reward in line with the value of their contribution, 
with the decision as to which reward to claim (if any) occurring online at the point at which 
the contribution itself is made.  The platform reports the identity of each funder, including the 
individual’s name and profile picture should they choose to display them, as well as the exact 
monetary amount they contribute to each campaign. All of this information is recorded and 
made publically visible on the campaign website.  This practice is unique to 
fundanything.com, as other leading platforms (including both Kickstarter and Indiegogo) do 
not disclose complete information relating to individual contribution amounts and rewards 
claimed. As a consequence of this reporting mechanism, we are able to demonstrate 
empirically how the recorded contributions of funders are determined by (interactions of) 
their motivations, rather than relying on self-reported attitudes or stated intentions to 
contribute. 
We used an automated program to scrape data relating to all recorded campaigns 
hosted on the fundanything.com website between 2013 and 2015.  In order to demonstrate 
how fundanything.com compares with other crowdfunding sites, Table 1 contains a broad 
overview of key campaign performance indicators drawn from a representative sample of 
platforms over an equivalent time period.  These statistics show fundanything.com to be 
broadly comparable to many other rewards-based crowdfunding sites.  The number of 
campaigns and the proportion that successfully reach their funding goals are somewhat lower 
compared with the two leading platforms Kickstarter and Indiegogo, but are similar to several 
others such as Crowdfunder.co.uk and Rocket Hub.  The average amounts raised by each 
campaign, as well as the size of individual contributions and the number of funders, are 
comparatively close to the equivalent values observed for other platforms.  Altogether, the 
platforms level statistics suggest that fundanything.com is fairly representative of a typical 
small-to-medium sized crowdfunding platform and that our results should therefore have 
general applicability outside of this setting. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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Our full dataset contains records of 54,727 contributions from individual funders 
which have been made towards a total of 2,143 different campaigns, raising an aggregate sum 
of just over $4.6 million.  Brief explanations and descriptive statistics for the variables used 
in our analysis presented in Table 2.  Alongside our dependent variable measuring individual 
contribution amounts (‘Amount Contributed’), we also include measures of whether the 
individual funder is ineligible or chooses not to claim a reward (‘Intrinsic Motivation’), as 
well as whether they choose to reveal their name (‘Named’).  The figures in Table 2 suggest 
that the proportion of funders in each category are around 39% and 74% respectively.  It 
seems particularly noteworthy that nearly 40% of funders contribute to rewards-based 
crowdfunding campaigns without claiming a reward.  This relatively high proportion of 
solely intrinsically motivated funders appears to be consistent with the findings of Allison et 
al. (2015), who show that intrinsic cues (appeals to altruism) appear to attract more 
contributors than extrinsic (business/financial) cues in the context of crowdfunding.  
Additionally, our dataset includes a number of controls for campaign-level characteristics, 
including the funding target ($) and number of social media (Facebook) shares; both of which 
might plausibly affect the magnitude of contributions towards particular campaigns. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Figure 1 contains a graphical representation of the distribution of our dependent 
‘Amount Contributed’ variable, reflecting the monetary value of each individual donation in 
descending order from highest to lowest.  It can be clearly seen that the distribution is highly 
skewed and consists of a very small number of large contributions alongside a much larger 
number of comparatively smaller contributions.  Due to concerns over the disproportionate 
impact of significant outliers, we elect to exclude contributions of $500 or more from our 
analysis, which is a threshold that appears to represent a natural cut-off point in the 
distribution.  As a result of the exclusion of these outliers, that dataset we use for our analysis 
consists of 53,766 observations, reducing the sample by around 1.8% compared with its 
original size. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Our dataset also allows us to control for heterogeneity between various types of fundraising 
campaigns using series of additional dummy variables to reflect the fundraising categories in 
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which they were listed on the fundanything.com platform.  These categories serve to 
differentiate and organise campaigns into groupings according to the nature of the activity 
being funded such Art, Business, Hopes & Dreams or Sport.  A graphical representation of 
the distribution of both campaigns and contributions across these categories is presented in 
Figure 2.  It can be seen that the distribution of contributions between categories is more 
skewed than the distribution of the campaigns.  More specifically, comparatively high 
proportions of campaigns are listed in the ‘Business’ (12.2%), ‘Family Needs’ (11.9%) and 
‘Hopes & Dreams’ (10.3%) categories, while ‘Film & Video’ (41.3%) and ‘Business’ 
(24.5%) represent the categories where the most contributions are received.  This disparity is 
a consequence of a skewed distribution of campaign performance whereby a small number of 
campaigns are disproportionately highly supported, which in particular accounts for the high 
number of contributions recorded for campaigns in the ‘Film & Video’ category.  Some other 
categories, such as ‘Design’ and ‘Politics’, contain a very small proportion of both campaigns 
(0.8% / 0.6%) and contributions (0.6% / 0.4%) respectively. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
4.2. Research Design 
In terms of addressing our primary research questions, the key independent variables 
summarised in Table 2 reflect the implied motivations associated with each individual 
contribution. As indicated above, the unique reporting framework of the fundanything.com 
crowdfunding platform allows us to separate funders into a number of groups according to 
the (combinations of) motivations demonstrated by their observed behaviours. In particular, 
we distinguish between funders on the basis of whether or not they claim a material rewards 
in return for their contributions. The contributions from funders who do not claim a reward 
must be solely driven by their intrinsic motivations, which may include altruism and warm-
glow (Tonin & Vlassopoulos, 2010) and/or playfulness and joy (Gerber et al., 2012; 
Cholakova & Clarysse 2015).  By contrast, funders that choose to claim a reward must be 
driven at least partly by extrinsic motivations. These two groups of funders respectively 
correspond to the ‘angelic backer’ and ‘reward hunter’ funder-types recognised by Ryu & 
Kim (2016), based on self-reported motivations among a sample of 580 contributors to 
Korean crowdfunding campaigns.   
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Similarly, we argue that anonymous funders cannot contribute to a crowdfunding campaign 
with the goal of enhancing their reputation, since it is impossible for them to be identified by 
others (Lacetera & Macis, 2010b; Carpenter & Myers, 2010).  By contrast, funders who make 
a conscious choice to reveal their identities in a publically visible, online setting are 
demonstrating to others that they are responsible for making the contribution.  These 
individuals must therefore be at least partly motivated by a desire to enhance their reputation 
with either the campaign founder, their friends, family and/or the wider crowdfunding 
community.  Thus, we distinguish between funders who are and are not motivated by a desire 
for image enhancement according to whether or not they choose to reveal their names when 
they make a contribution. 
 
To capture the impacts of (interactions of) motivations on funder’s contributions we use two 
main independent variables and their interactions.  More specifically, the Intrinsic variable is 
equal to one (zero) where funders are solely intrinsically motivated (at least partly 
extrinsically motivated).  In making this distinction, we acknowledge that even the funders 
who claim a reward might still be at least partly intrinsically motivated. However, claiming a 
reward clearly implies that these funders must also be at least partly extrinsically motivated, 
clearly distinguishing them from those who do not claim any form of material reward in 
return for their contribution.  The Named variable is equal to one (zero) if funders do (do not) 
reveal their name, which we interpret as at least a partial desire for image enhancement. 
Interactions between extrinsic, intrinsic and image motivations are captured by an interaction 
term (i.e. Intrinsic·Named), which reflects funders who we identify as being driven by both 
intrinsic and image motivations. Table 3 provides a summary of the potential values for each 
of these variables in relation to observed behaviours and their implied motivations, as well as 
the proportion of funders in our dataset that fall into each of these categories.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
5. Analysis 
 
5.1 Primary Model Specifications 
It is clear from Figure 1 that the dependent variable in our analysis is highly skewed.  
We therefore undertake a series of Poisson regressions on the untransformed dependent 
variable. We favour Poisson regressions given their superiority to log regressions and, by 
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using robust standard errors (Huber-White-Sandwich linearised estimators of variance), we 
are able to bypass the assumption that the mean of the dependent variable is equal to its 
variance (Gould, 2011).  Another rationale for the use of Poisson regressions is that 
contribution amounts tend to be concentrated around significant monetary integers (e.g., $5, 
$10, $20) and are non-negative and discrete. As such, the dependent variable is similar in 
many respects to count data.  The output from our Poisson regression analysis is reported in 
Table 4.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The results from Specification I are consistent with our hypothesis H1 and clearly 
show that funders identified as being solely intrinsically motivated tend to contribute around 
23% less than extrinsically motivated funders2 while holding the values of all other variables 
constant.  In Specification II where we do not control for intrinsic motivations, we show that 
named funders contribute around 5% more than anonymous funders3.  This same pattern also 
appears to hold when simultaneously controlling for intrinsic/extrinsic and image motivations 
in Specification III, although the magnitude of increase in contributions observed among 
named funders appears to decline to around 2.5%.  The estimated coefficient for the term 
capturing the interaction between intrinsically motivated, named funders included in 
Specification IV is positive and significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient estimate for 
named funders is not found to be statistically significantly different from zero. This implies 
that named funders with intrinsic motivations contribute around 7.3% more than anonymous 
intrinsic funders, while named extrinsic funders give around the same amount compared with 
anonymous extrinsic funders4.   These findings therefore support our hypotheses H2a and 
H2b.  
We also show evidence of significant heterogeneity in amounts given to campaigns 
listed in different fundraising categories.  Relative to the base case of campaigns in the 
‘Business’ category, individual contributions tend to be higher across the board for other 
types of campaign, particularly those in the ‘Design’, ‘Writing’ and ‘Funerals’ categories.  
The differences observed between contributions received for campaigns in each category 
appears consistent across model specifications.  Further, our regression output consistently 
                                                          
2 The interpretation of the dummy coefficient of -0.262 in a Poisson regression is (e-0.262 – 1)*100 = -23%. 
3 (e0.048 – 1)*100 = 5%. 
4 As the estimated coefficient of the Named variable is not statistically significant in model IV, the difference of contribution between 
named intrinsic funders and anonymous intrinsic funders is simply equal to the estimated coefficient of the interaction term which is (e0.070 – 
1)*100 = 7.3% 
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demonstrates that amounts contributed tend to associate positively and significantly with both 
the number of social media (Facebook) shares received by the campaign, as well as the size 
of the funding target. 
For comparison, Table 5 reports the multivariate analysis of the effect of motivations 
on funders’ contribution to campaigns using conventional ordinary least squares regressions 
with robust standard errors.  The coefficient estimates from these regressions are largely 
consistent with those appearing in Table 4 and show in Specification I that intrinsically 
motivated funders tend to give about $12 less towards each campaign compared with those 
who are extrinsically motivated. As before in Specification II, we show that named funders 
typically contribute around $2 more towards campaigns compared with those who remain 
anonymous, falling to around $1 more when controlling for both variables together in 
Specification III.  The results from Specification IV, specifically the interaction term, further 
suggests that named funders with intrinsic motivations contribute a little over $2 more on 
average compared with anonymous intrinsic funders, while named extrinsic funders are again 
shown to give around the same amount compared with anonymous extrinsic funders.    
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
5.2 Robustness Checks 
The results presented above are supportive of our research hypotheses.  However, in 
order to check the robustness of our findings, we present a number of additional Poisson 
regressions performed on reduced sub-samples of the data in Table 6.  Specifications I and II 
are based on sub-samples including only intrinsically and extrinsically motivated funders 
respectively.  The results are consistent with those presented in the previous section and show 
that among intrinsically motivated funders, those who are named contribute around 7% more 
than those who remain anonymous.  Conversely among extrinsically motivated funders, there 
is no statistically significant difference observed in the amounts contributed between named 
and anonymous funders.  Specifications III and IV are based on sub-samples consisting of 
only anonymous and named funders respectively.  Again, consistent with previous results, we 
show that funders with intrinsic motivations contribute less than those with extrinsic 
motivations in both sub samples.  However, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates 
suggests that the reduction in amounts given is lower among named funders (-21%) than 
among anonymous funders (-26%).  In other words, named funders with intrinsic motivations 
are shown to give relatively more than anonymous funders with intrinsic motivations.   
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Although our dataset does not allow us to control for many sociodemographic 
characteristics of the funder, we are able to use the names they provide in order to imply their 
gender using a specialist algorithm5.  Based on inputting the first names of funders exactly as 
they appear on the fundanything.com site, we are able to assign gender values to around 97% 
of the contributions recorded from named funders.  We use this information to construct a 
dummy variable for female contributors, which we include as an independent variable in 
Specification V.  The results show that the coefficient for funder gender is not statistically 
different from zero and that the other coefficient estimates remain almost exactly the same 
compared with Specification IV.  This leads us to conclude that funder gender does not 
associate with any significant variations in contribution levels. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
In addition to the above, we present a further set of regression results to demonstrate 
the robustness of our findings in Table 7.  In these results, we elect not to report the results 
associated with category dummies to conserve space, given that the coefficient estimates are 
substantively similar to those outlined previously.  In Specifications I-III, we divide the 
sample into sub-sections of contributions recorded for campaigns in three broad types of 
category; Commercial, Prosocial and Creative.  In all three cases, the results are largely 
consistent with the main results, in that solely intrinsically motivated funders are shown to 
give less than partly extrinsically motivated funders.  The results also show that intrinsically 
motivated named funders typically give more than intrinsically motivated anonymous 
funders. On the other hand, named extrinsic funders contribute amounts which are equal to or 
less than those anonymous extrinsic funders in both the Prosocial and Creative categories. 
Our finding that named funders with intrinsic motivations give more than anonymous funders 
with intrinsic motivations holds in the case of Prosocial and Creative campaigns (+15% and 
+7% respectively), but the difference is not statistically significant in the case of Commercial 
campaigns.  This finding suggests that the behaviour of named and anonymous intrinsically 
motivated funders only holds for campaigns that are non-commercial in nature.  Altogether, 
the results continue to support our research hypotheses. 
Specifications IV and V contain subsamples of only the campaigns that were 
successful and unsuccessful in meeting their funding goals respectively.  Among successful 
                                                          
5 The algorithm we employ is publically accessible via the website genderize.io. 
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campaigns, the pattern of behaviour observed above remains consistent with previous results; 
funders with solely intrinsic motivations contribute less than those with partly extrinsic 
motivations, while named funders with intrinsic motivations contribute more than anonymous 
funders with intrinsic motivations. We also do not find that named extrinsic funders give 
more than anonymous extrinsic funders. For unsuccessful campaigns, we still find that solely 
intrinsic funders give less than partly extrinsic funders.  However, we do not find evidence of 
significant differences between contributions from named and anonymous funders.  A likely 
reason for this finding is that, by definition, a significant majority of individual contributions 
(74% of our dataset) are recorded for campaigns that successfully reach their funding goals, 
leaving a relatively smaller pool of contributions to failed campaigns.   
In Specification VI, we include a measure of whether the funder includes a publically 
visible photo as another (potentially stronger) indicator of a desire for image enhancement.  
Around 5.5% of funders choose to display a photo, with almost all among this group also 
providing a name along with their contribution.  The results are largely consistent with other 
specifications, showing a reduction of about 36% in the amount contributed by funders who 
are solely intrinsically motivated, no statistically significant change in amounts contributed 
by named funders and around a 7.4% increase in contributions from named contributors with 
solely intrinsic motivations.  We further show that where a funder includes a photograph of 
themselves, contributions are shown to increase by a further 8.5% on average compared with 
funders that do not display a photo.  This finding implies that such individuals have an even 
stronger desire for image enhancement and contribute higher sums accordingly.  Finally, in 
Specification VII, we report an estimation based on the full data sample, inclusive of the 
large outlying observations that were originally excluded. The results suggest that funders 
with solely intrinsic motivations contribute significantly less than those with partly extrinsic 
contributions, while named contributors are shown to contribute less than anonymous 
contributors.  Unlike the original estimations, the latter estimate is found to be statistically 
significant.  However, these results continue to show that intrinsically motivated named 
funders contribute around 16% more than named funders with extrinsic motivations6.  The 
results are again supportive of our hypotheses and suggest that the inclusion/exclusion of 
outliers does not substantively alter the main conclusions of the study. 
 
                                                          
6 Given that the Named coefficient is statistically significant and negative, the comparison between intrinsically motivated named funders 
and intrinsically motivated anonymous funders can be made by summing the percentage changes associated with both the Named coefficient 
and the interaction term, i.e. (e-0.332 – 1)*100 = -28.3% + (e0.365 – 1)*100 = +44.1% = + 15.8%. 
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[Table 7 about here] 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This study empirically investigates the motivations of contributors to rewards-based 
crowdfunding campaigns.  Using a unique approach, funders are grouped according to their 
apparent motivations based upon observed behaviours, i.e. whether or not they claim a 
reward and/or choose to identify themselves publically.  Even though a majority of funders 
appear motivated at least partly by material incentives, we find evidence to suggest that a 
significant proportion (39%) do not claim rewards and must therefore be solely intrinsically 
motivated. This comparative level of ‘altruistic’ behaviour is somewhat surprising in the 
context of a crowdfunding platform designed around the rewards-based model.  In addressing 
our first research question, we further demonstrate that partly extrinsically motivated funders 
tend to make larger contributions to rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns than solely 
intrinsically motivated funders, which does not support the prediction of a ‘crowding out’ 
effect as per Titmuss (1970), Lacetera & Macis (2010a) and Mellström & Johannesson 
(2008). 
Depending on the modelling specification used, we further observe a relatively small 
variation in contributions from funders that name themselves publically, who are more likely 
to be at least partly motivated by the potential for image enhancement compared with those 
contributors electing to remain anonymous.  However, when we include terms to capture the 
interaction between intrinsic and image motivations in addressing our second research 
question, we show pronounced differences in the role of image concerns among funders who 
are solely intrinsically motivated compared with those who are partly extrinsically motivated.  
More specifically, we show that named, intrinsically motivated funders tend to contribute 
significantly greater amounts towards campaigns than intrinsically motivated anonymous 
funders.  We also show that named funders with extrinsic motivations contribute the same or 
lower amounts compared with anonymous funders with extrinsic motivations. 
Our findings have practical implications particularly for the founders of crowdfunding 
campaigns.  First, it is possible that the relatively high proportion of funders who elect not to 
claim a reward might be incentivised to do so (and hence contribute greater amounts) in the 
presence of a wider selection of more attractive rewards.  We therefore suggest that the 
number and quality of rewards offered to potential funders is likely to be of vital importance 
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in determining crowdfunding outcomes and should be considered carefully by funders prior 
to the start of a campaign.  Second, although named, intrinsically motivated funders may 
never elect to claim a reward due to concerns over the dilution of the social value of their 
signal, is possible that campaign founders could elect to recognise and reward them in 
different ways.  This might include special acknowledgements that could be linked to the 
funders profile and/or disseminated via social media channels to highlight that the funder has 
contributed to a project without claiming a reward.  Given the implied motivations and 
behaviours of this group, the transmission of such publically visible signals is likely to be 
highly valued and may encourage greater quantities and/or values of contributions.  
The findings of this study are consistent with theories of pro-social giving (Benabou 
& Tirole, 2006; Ariely et al., 2009), whereby image enhancement tends to occur only when 
contributions are perceived by others as being generous, altruistic or prosocial. The rejection 
of material rewards signals altruistic intentions on the part of the funder and may therefore 
represent an essential component of the reputation-seeking behaviour associated with visible 
participation in online crowdfunding campaigns.  Through an extensive series of robustness 
checks, we demonstrate that our findings hold in almost all of the different ways in which we 
model the data, the most notable exception being that, unlike Prosocial and Creative 
campaigns, the differences in behaviours observed for named and anonymous intrinsically 
motivated funders does not appear to hold for Commercial campaigns.  This seems to imply 
that any possible desire for image enhancement resulting from solely intrinsically motivated 
contributions only holds when the cause being supported is appropriate to the altruistic 
behaviour being signalled.  Altogether, our findings suggest that the complex range and 
interactions of funder motivations are important in explaining variations in behaviours and 
outcomes in crowdfunding, with implied intrinsic and extrinsic motivations seemingly 
representing valued signalling mechanisms that influence the actions of funders seeking to 
enhance their image.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Reward-Based Crowdfunding Campaign Outcomes by Platform 
Crowdfunding Platform 
Number of 
Campaigns 
Campaign 
Success Rate 
Average Amount 
Raised 
Average Indiv. 
Contribution 
Average No. of 
Funders 
Fundanything.com 2,143 7% $2,234 $74 25 
Kickstarter 93,340 33% $6,495 $63 80 
Indiegogo 103,768 14% $2,841 $53 33 
Crowdfunder.co.uk 3,151 25% $3,031 $58 27 
Fundrazr 830 22% $2,066 $96 26 
Rocket Hub 4,114 6% $831 $33 9 
Sponsume 416 10% $1,189 $32 23 
Data from Fundanything.com was collected between 2013 and 2015.  Data from all other platforms are retrieved from the Crowd Data 
Center covering an equivalent period (http://www.thecrowdfundingcenter.com/data/). Sponsume ceased operating in May 2015. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
Amount Contributed ($) The $ amount contributed by individual i to campaign j. 
 
74.29 345.13 30.00 1.00 25,000 
Intrinsic Motivation Dummy variable; =1 where the individual i elects not to 
claim a reward to which they may have been entitled. 
 
0.39 - - 0 1 
Named Dummy variable; = 1 where the individual agent i elects 
to reveal their identity when making a contribution. 
 
0.74 - - 0 1 
Social Media Shares The aggregate number of social media (Facebook) shares 
achieved by campaign j. 
 
66 359 0 0 6,665 
Funding Target ($) The $ amount that the founder of crowdfunding campaign 
j seeks to raise. 
 
88,653 560,634 7,500 1 10,000,000 
 
 
Table 3: Classification of Implied Motivations According to Observed Behaviours 
Variable Values Observed Behaviours Implied Motivation(s) Proportion of Funders 
Intrinsic Motivation = 1 
Named = 0 
Intrinsic ⋅ Named = 0 
DOES NOT claim reward 
DOES NOT provide name or picture.  
Purely intrinsic 14.2% 
Intrinsic Motivation = 1 
Named = 1 
Intrinsic ⋅ Named = 1 
DOES NOT claim reward 
Provides name and/or picture. 
Mix of intrinsic and image concerns 25.1% 
Intrinsic Motivation = 0 
Named = 0 
Intrinsic ⋅ Named = 0 
Claims reward 
DOES NOT Provide name or picture. 
Mix of intrinsic and extrinsic  11.9% 
Intrinsic Motivation = 0 
Named = 1 
Intrinsic ⋅ Named = 0 
Claims reward 
Provides name and/or picture. 
Mix of intrinsic, extrinsic and image 
concerns 
48.7% 
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Table 4: Poisson Regressions of Individual-Level Contributions 
Dependent Variable: Amount Contributed 
Model I II III IV 
Intrinsic Motivation (=1) -0.262 
(0.013) 
***   -0.259 
(0.013) 
*** -0.307 
(0.021) 
*** 
Named (=1)   0.048 
(0.011) 
*** 0.024 
(0.011) 
** -0.006 
(0.015) 
 
Intrinsic Motivation * Named       0.070 
(0.023) 
*** 
Ln Social Media Shares  0.015 
(0.003) 
*** 0.022 
(0.003) 
*** 0.014 
(0.003) 
*** 0.014 
(0.003) 
*** 
Ln Funding Target ($) 0.052 
(0.004) 
*** 0.067 
(0.004) 
*** 0.052 
(0.004) 
*** 0.053 
(0.004) 
*** 
Art (=1) 0.687 
(0.096) 
*** 0.800 
(0.096) 
*** 0.685 
(0.096) 
*** 0.688 
(0.096) 
*** 
Community (=1) 0.763 
(0.049) 
*** 0.721 
(0.049) 
*** 0.757 
(0.049) 
*** 0.756 
(0.049) 
*** 
Design (=1) 1.012 
(0.047) 
*** 1.155 
(0.048) 
*** 1.015 
(0.047) 
*** 1.009 
(0.047) 
*** 
Education (=1) 0.841 
(0.030) 
*** 0.808 
(0.031) 
*** 0.839 
(0.030) 
*** 0.839 
(0.030) 
*** 
Family Needs (=1) 0.810 
(0.030) 
*** 0.741 
(0.030) 
*** 0.806 
(0.030) 
*** 0.806 
(0.030) 
*** 
Film & Video (=1) 0.491 
(0.012) 
*** 0.537 
(0.012) 
*** 0.486 
(0.012) 
*** 0.489 
(0.012) 
*** 
Funerals (=1) 1.007 
(0.054) 
*** 0.971 
(0.053) 
*** 1.002 
(0.054) 
*** 1.001 
(0.054) 
*** 
Gaming (=1) 0.194 
(0.048) 
*** 0.302 
(0.049) 
*** 0.195 
(0.048) 
*** 0.192 
(0.048) 
*** 
Hopes and Dreams (=1) 0.527 
(0.036) 
*** 0.487 
(0.036) 
*** 0.522 
(0.036) 
*** 0.522 
(0.036) 
*** 
Medical (=1) 0.869 
(0.033) 
*** 0.815 
(0.033) 
*** 0.865 
(0.033) 
*** 0.866 
(0.033) 
*** 
Music (=1) 0.366 
(0.042) 
*** 0.456 
(0.042) 
*** 0.363 
(0.042) 
*** 0.364 
(0.043) 
*** 
Non-Profit (=1) 0.482 
(0.029) 
*** 0.439 
(0.029) 
*** 0.479 
(0.029) 
*** 0.479 
(0.029) 
*** 
Pets & Animals (=1) 0.517 
(0.038) 
*** 0.490 
(0.038) 
*** 0.513 
(0.038) 
*** 0.514 
(0.038) 
*** 
Politics (=1) 0.583 
(0.079) 
*** 0.606 
(0.081) 
*** 0.583 
(0.079) 
*** 0.584 
(0.079) 
*** 
Sports (=1) 0.615 
(0.060) 
*** 0.606 
(0.060) 
*** 0.609 
(0.060) 
*** 0.608 
(0.060) 
*** 
Technology (=1) 0.334 
(0.067) 
*** 0.432 
(0.067) 
*** 0.334 
(0.067) 
*** 0.333 
(0.067) 
*** 
Theater (=1) 0.810 
(0.053) 
*** 0.805 
(0.053) 
*** 0.804 
(0.054) 
*** 0.802 
(0.054) 
*** 
Volunteering (=1) 0.688 
(0.066) 
*** 0.741 
(0.067) 
*** 0.684 
(0.066) 
*** 0.683 
(0.066) 
*** 
Web Projects (=1) 0.477 
(0.120) 
*** 0.555 
(0.119) 
*** 0.475 
(0.120) 
*** 0.476 
(0.120) 
*** 
Writing (=1) 1.349 
(0.048) 
*** 1.464 
(0.048) 
*** 1.348 
(0.048) 
*** 1.347 
(0.048) 
*** 
Other (=1) 0.747 
(0.086) 
*** 0.764 
(0.085) 
*** 0.744 
(0.086) 
*** 0.745 
(0.086) 
*** 
Constant 2.839 
(0.056) 
*** 2.468 
(0.053) 
*** 2.826 
(0.057) 
*** 2.842 
(0.057) 
*** 
Number of Observations 53,766  53,766  53,766  53,766  
Wald Chi2 4483.700 *** 4129.280 *** 4505.370 *** 4493.150 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.093  0.085  0.093  0.094  
Dependent variable is the $ amount contributed by individual i to campaign j.  Ln Social Media (Facebook) Shares and Ln 
Funding Target ($) are respectively the natural logarithms of aggregate number of social media (Facebooks) shares and the $ 
value of the fundraising target recorded for campaign j. All other variables are defined in Table 2.   Campaigns in the 
‘Business’ category represent the base case.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 5: OLS Regressions of Individual-Level Contributions 
Dependent Variable: Amount Contributed 
Model I II III IV 
Intrinsic Motivation (=1) -11.760 
(0.552) 
***   -11.602 
(0.557) 
*** -13.214 
(0.902) 
*** 
Named (=1)   2.363 
(0.527) 
*** 1.139 
(0.529) 
** -0.061 
(0.787) 
 
Intrinsic Motivation * Named       2.375 
(1.050) 
** 
Ln Social Media Shares  0.593 
(0.130) 
*** 0.919 
(0.128) 
*** 0.589 
(0.130) 
*** 0.583 
(0.130) 
*** 
Ln Funding Target ($) 2.601 
(0.185) 
*** 3.212 
(0.184) 
*** 2.597 
(0.185) 
*** 2.622 
(1.186) 
*** 
Art (=1) 30.484 
(4.577) 
*** 35.239 
(4.602) 
*** 30.388 
(4.579) 
*** 30.519 
(4.582) 
*** 
Community (=1) 33.681 
(2.355) 
*** 31.749 
(2.342) 
*** 33.434 
(2.334) 
*** 33.402 
(2.332) 
*** 
Design (=1) 53.184 
(3.534) 
*** 59.558 
(3.597) 
*** 53.339 
(3.537) 
*** 53.128 
(3.537) 
*** 
Education (=1) 38.451 
(1.569) 
*** 36.903 
(1.590) 
*** 38.329 
(1.570) 
*** 38.364 
(1.570) 
*** 
Family Needs (=1) 35.891 
(1.370) 
*** 32.876 
(1.381) 
*** 35.689 
(1.376) 
*** 35.692 
(1.377) 
*** 
Film & Video (=1) 23.007 
(0.537) 
*** 25.140 
(0.545) 
*** 22.783 
(0.551) 
*** 22.903 
(0.556) 
*** 
Funerals (=1) 46.876 
(3.116) 
*** 45.151 
(3.076) 
*** 46.657 
(3.111) 
*** 46.645 
(3.108) 
*** 
Gaming (=1) 8.264 
(1.848) 
*** 13.086 
(1.860) 
*** 8.314 
(1.848) 
*** 8.192 
(1.847) 
*** 
Hopes and Dreams (=1) 23.452 
(1.409) 
*** 21.631 
(1.427) 
*** 23.254 
(1.414) 
*** 23.269 
(1.414) 
*** 
Medical (=1) 38.972 
(1.611) 
*** 36.524 
(1.617) 
*** 38.812 
(1.612) 
*** 38.836 
(1.613) 
*** 
Music (=1) 16.701 
(1.637) 
*** 20.509 
(1.612) 
*** 16.566 
(1.638) 
*** 16.622 
(1.639) 
*** 
Non-Profit (=1) 20.769 
(1.165) 
*** 18.707 
(1.168) 
*** 20.621 
(1.167) 
*** 20.618 
(1.167) 
*** 
Pets & Animals (=1) 23.306 
(1.458) 
*** 21.919 
(1.475) 
*** 23.123 
(1.463) 
*** 23.186 
(1.465) 
*** 
Politics (=1) 25.716 
(3.488) 
*** 26.355 
(3.577) 
*** 25.704 
(3.489) 
*** 25.766 
(3.491) 
*** 
Sports (=1) 27.183 
(2.483) 
*** 26.572 
(2.507) 
*** 26.902 
(2.486) 
*** 26.864 
(2.487) 
*** 
Technology (=1) 14.590 
(2.561) 
*** 18.978 
(2.572) 
*** 14.572 
(2.560) 
*** 14.544 
(2.559) 
*** 
Theater (=1) 36.705 
(2.851) 
*** 36.185 
(2.836) 
*** 36.429 
(2.855) 
*** 36.378 
(2.856) 
*** 
Volunteering (=1) 30.424 
(3.019) 
*** 32.324 
(3.028) 
*** 30.218 
(3.028) 
*** 30.183 
(3.028) 
*** 
Web Projects (=1) 20.849 
(4.934) 
*** 24.100 
(4.876) 
*** 20.737 
(4.933) 
*** 20.806 
(4.934) 
*** 
Writing (=1) 84.470 
(4.973) 
*** 89.407 
(5.013) 
*** 84.413 
(4.977) 
*** 84.416 
(4.974) 
*** 
Other (=1) 32.988 
(4.070) 
*** 33.547 
(4.043) 
*** 32.855 
(4.081) 
*** 32.918 
(4.082) 
*** 
Constant 0.671 
(2.356) 
 -15.672 
(2.230) 
*** -0.007 
(2.369) 
 0.600 
(2.381) 
 
Number of Observations 53,766  53,766  53,766  53,766  
F 183.360 *** 164.250 *** 177.190 *** 170.380 *** 
R2 0.079  0.073  0.079  0.079  
Dependent variable is the $ amount contributed by individual i to campaign j.  Ln Social Media (Facebook) Shares and Ln 
Funding Target ($) are respectively the natural logarithms of aggregate number of social media (Facebooks) shares and the $ 
value of the fundraising target recorded for campaign j. Campaigns in the ‘Business’ category represent the base case.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6: Poisson Regressions of Reduced Sub-Samples 
Dependent Variable: Amount Contributed 
Model 
I 
Intrinsic  
Only 
II 
Extrinsic 
Only 
III 
Anonymous  
Only 
IV 
Named  
Only 
V 
Named Only  
w/ Gender 
Intrinsic Motivation (=1)     -0.301 
(0.023) 
*** -0.236 
(0.016) 
*** -0.226 
(0.016) 
*** 
Named (=1) 0.071 
(0.018) 
*** -0.020 
(0.015) 
       
Funder Gender Female (=1)         -0.012 
(0.014) 
 
Ln Social Media Shares  0.014 
(0.003) 
*** 0.029 
(0.007) 
*** 0.016 
(0.005) 
*** 0.014 
(0.004) 
*** 0.015 
(0.004) 
*** 
Ln Funding Target ($) 0.022 
(0.007) 
*** 0.024 
(0.007) 
*** 0.054 
(0.009) 
*** 0.053 
(0.005) 
*** 0.053 
(0.005) 
*** 
Art (=1) 0.398 
(0.157) 
** 0.680 
(0.121) 
** 0.736 
(0.202) 
*** 0.667 
(0.105) 
*** 0.676 
(0.109) 
*** 
Community (=1) 0.567 
(0.057) 
*** 0.685 
(0.123) 
*** 0.692 
(0.086) 
*** 0.764 
(0.058) 
*** 0.765 
(0.059) 
*** 
Design (=1) -0.474 
(0.395) 
 1.139 
(0.054) 
 1.104 
(0.068) 
*** 0.949 
(0.069) 
*** 0.971 
(0.070) 
*** 
Education (=1) 0.610 
(0.042) 
*** 0.913 
(0.049) 
*** 0.923 
(0.052) 
*** 0.798 
(0.037) 
*** 0.802 
(0.038) 
*** 
Family Needs (=1) 0.623 
(0.039) 
*** 0.288 
(0.095) 
*** 0.926 
(0.056) 
*** 0.751 
(0.035) 
*** 0.725 
(0.036) 
*** 
Film & Video (=1) 0.050 
(0.038) 
 0.597 
(0.017) 
 0.568 
(0.026) 
*** 0.456 
(0.014) 
*** 0.463 
(0.014) 
*** 
Funerals (=1) 0.878 
(0.062) 
*** 0.177 
(0.092) 
* 0.822 
(0.106) 
*** 1.048 
(0.062) 
*** 1.040 
(0.061) 
*** 
Gaming (=1) -0.410 
(0.131) 
*** 0.220 
(0.052) 
*** 0.306 
(0.084) 
*** 0.126 
(0.058) 
** 0.159 
(0.059) 
*** 
Hopes and Dreams (=1) 0.289 
(0.048) 
*** 0.552 
(0.071) 
*** 0.635 
(0.066) 
*** 0.472 
(0.043) 
*** 0.489 
(0.044) 
*** 
Medical (=1) 0.704 
(0.043) 
*** 0.408 
(0.063) 
*** 0.943 
(0.057) 
*** 0.828 
(0.040) 
*** 0.843 
(0.042) 
*** 
Music (=1) 0.320 
(0.073) 
*** 0.251 
(0.054) 
*** 0.350 
(0.084) 
*** 0.365 
(0.049) 
*** 0.382 
(0.050) 
*** 
Non-Profit (=1) 0.390 
(0.038) 
*** 0.158 
(0.050) 
*** 0.468 
(0.053) 
*** 0.483 
(0.034) 
*** 0.493 
(0.035) 
*** 
Pets & Animals (=1) 0.289 
(0.050) 
*** 0.432 
(0.079) 
*** 0.696 
(0.071) 
*** 0.430 
(0.045) 
*** 0.445 
(0.046) 
*** 
Politics (=1) 0.168 
(0.133) 
 0.850 
(0.092) 
 0.648 
(0.121) 
*** 0.554 
(0.105) 
*** 0.569 
(0.110) 
*** 
Sports (=1) 0.383 
(0.071) 
*** 0.576 
(0.124) 
*** 0.662 
(0.102) 
*** 0.580 
(0.071) 
*** 0.608 
(0.072) 
*** 
Technology (=1) 0.096 
(0.128) 
 0.390 
(0.083) 
 0.300 
(0.095) 
*** 0.360 
(0.089) 
*** 0.414 
(0.090) 
*** 
Theater (=1) 0.691 
(0.070) 
*** 0.627 
(0.089) 
*** 0.883 
(0.123) 
*** 0.768 
(0.060) 
*** 0.786 
(0.061) 
*** 
Volunteering (=1) 0.514 
(0.090) 
*** 0.603 
(0.103) 
*** 0.925 
(0.144) 
*** 0.580 
(0.070) 
*** 0.618 
(0.071) 
*** 
Web Projects (=1) 0.597 
(0.166) 
*** 0.207 
(0.167) 
 0.512 
(0.227) 
** 0.460 
(0.141) 
*** 0.482 
(0.143) 
*** 
Writing (=1) 0.435 
(0.133) 
*** 1.468 
(0.055) 
*** 1.538 
(0.076) 
*** 1.249 
(0.061) 
*** 1.262 
(0.062) 
*** 
Other (=1) 0.657 
(0.115) 
*** 0.399 
(0.098) 
*** 1.122 
(0.159) 
*** 0.515 
(0.083) 
*** 0.527 
(0.084) 
*** 
Constant 3.016 
(0.087) 
*** 3.055 
(0.077) 
*** 2.754 
(0.110) 
*** 2.864 
(0.066) 
*** 2.849 
(0.069) 
*** 
Number of Observations 21,398  32,368  14,062  39,704  38,486  
Wald Chi2 893.07 *** 3443.220 *** 1440.040 *** 2877.780 *** 2834.240 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.050  0.102  0.117  0.081  0.081  
Dependent variable is the $ amount contributed by individual i to campaign j.  Ln Social Media (Facebook) Shares and Ln Funding Target ($) 
are respectively the natural logarithms of aggregate number of social media (Facebooks) shares and the $ value of the fundraising target recorded 
for campaign j. Campaigns in the ‘Business’ category represent the base case. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, 
*** p < .01 
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Table 7: Poisson Regression Robustness Checks 
Dependent Variable: Amount Contributed 
Model 
I 
Commercial 
Only 
II 
Prosocial  
Only 
III 
Creative  
Only 
IV 
Successful  
Only 
V 
Unsuccessful 
Only 
VI 
Including  
Photo 
VII 
Including  
Outliers 
Intrinsic Motivation (=1) -0.135 
(0.031) 
*** -0.149 
(0.046) 
*** -0.613 
(0.050) 
*** -0.314 
(0.025) 
*** -0.193 
(0.040) 
*** -0.307 
(0.021) 
*** -0.750 
(0.058) 
*** 
Named (=1) 0.120 
(0.022) 
*** -0.070 
(0.048) 
 -0.085 
(0.019) 
*** -0.014 
(0.016) 
 -0.003 
(0.036) 
 -0.013 
(0.015) 
 -0.332 
(0.068) 
*** 
Intrinsic Motivation * Named -0.010 
(0.040) 
 0.144 
(0.053) 
*** 0.140 
(0.057) 
** 0.085 
(0.028) 
*** 0.042 
(0.045) 
 0.071 
(0.023) 
*** 0.365 
(0.071) 
*** 
Photo (=1) 
          
0.082 
(0.020) 
*** 
 
 
Ln Social Media Shares  -0.021 
(0.009) 
** 0.019 
(0.003) 
*** 0.082 
(0.011) 
*** 0.048 
(0.007) 
*** 0.012 
(0.004) 
*** 0.015 
(0.003) 
*** 0.049 
(0.006) 
*** 
Ln Funding Target ($) -0.028 
(0.177) 
* 0.031 
(0.006) 
*** 0.019 
(0.008) 
** 0.077 
(0.007) 
*** 0.024 
(0.006) 
*** 0.052 
(0.004) 
*** 0.046 
(0.010) 
*** 
Project Category Controls YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Constant 4.046 
(0.162) 
*** 3.415 
(0.079) 
*** 3.348 
(0.084) 
*** 2.177 
(0.104) 
*** 3.593 
(0.079) 
*** 2.846 
(0.057) 
*** 3.004 
(0.121) 
*** 
Number of Observations 13,728  14,253  25,150  39,844  13,922  53,766  54,727  
Wald Chi2 128.060 *** 426.130 *** 1291.030 *** 5229.910 *** 368.050 *** 4503.140 *** 1936.840 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.013  0.033  0.086  0.132  0.028  0.094  0.103  
Dependent variable is the $ amount contributed by individual i to campaign j.  Ln Social Media (Facebook) Shares and Ln Funding Target ($) are respectively the natural logarithms 
of aggregate number of social media (Facebooks) shares and the $ value of the fundraising target recorded for campaign j. All other variables are defined in Table 2.  Categories 
included in the ‘Business Only’ regression are Business and Technology.  Categories included in the ‘Prosocial Only’ regression are Community, Education, Family Needs, Funerals, 
Hopes & Dreams, Medical, Non-Profit, Pets & Animals, Sports and Volunteering. Categories included in the ‘Creative Only’ regression are Art, Design, Film & Video, Gaming, 
Music, Theater & Dance and Writing.  Base cases are indicated in italics.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Contribution Amounts 
 
  
 
Note: This figure presents the distribution of individual contribution amounts received for campaigns in our dataset, ranked in order from 
the highest contributions on the left to the lowest on the right.  The highly skewed nature of this distribution demonstrates that campaigns 
on the fundanything.com platform tend to attract a small number of large contributions and a large number of small contributions.   
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Figure 2: Proportion of Campaigns and Contributions by Category 
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Note: This figure presents the proportion of campaigns in our dataset featuring in each fundraising category, as well as the proportion of 
individual contributions received.  The figure demonstrates that campaigns in the Flim & Video and Business categories receive a 
disproportionately high number of contributions relative to the number of campaigns featuring in said categories. 
 
